It Is Shown That No One Can, Or Need, Transfer All His Rights To The Sovereign
Power. Of The Hebrew Republic, As It Was During The Lifetime Of Moses, And
After His Death, Till The Foundation Of The Monarchy; And Of Its Excellence.
Lastly, Of The Causes Why The Theocratic Republic Fell, And Why It Could
Hardly Have Continued Without Dissension.
[17:1] (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal rights of the
sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual transferred thereto, though it
corresponds in many respects with actual practice, and though practice may be so
arranged as to conform to it more and more, must nevertheless always remain in many
respects purely ideal. (2) No one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and,
consequently, his rights, as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so
sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish. (3) It will always be vain to order a
subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to love what brings him loss, or
not to be offended at insults, or not to wish to be free from fear, or a hundred other things
of the sort, which necessarily follow from the laws of human nature. (4) So much, I think,
is abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power as to
cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power and right; and
dominions have always been in as much danger from their own subjects as from external
enemies. (5) If it were really the case, that men could be deprived of their natural rights
so utterly as never to have any further influence on affairs [Endnote 29], except with the
permission of the holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to maintain with
impunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an instant admit.
(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his right, in
dependence on his own decision, and no one else's.
(7) However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's right and
power, we must take notice that it does not cover only those actions to which it can
compel men by fear, but absolutely every action which it can induce men to perform: for
it is the fact of obedience, not the motive for obedience, which makes a man a subject.
(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the sovereign,
whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country, or any other emotion - the fact remains
that the man takes counsel with himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders. (9)
We must not, therefore, assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with
himself are done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign: as
a matter of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with himself, whether the
determining motive be love or fear of punishment; therefore, either dominion does not
exist, and has no rights over its subjects, or else it extends over every instance in which it
can prevail on men to decide to obey it. (10) Consequently, every action which a subject
performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign, whether such action springs
