1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is an
established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate
principles; some primary notions, {koinai ennoiai,} characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of
man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be
sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show
(as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural
faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and
may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will
easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom
God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less
unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate
characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge
of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of
truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that
made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave
to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
2. General assent the great argument. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that
there are certain principles, both speculative and practical, (for they speak of both), universally
agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions
which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as
necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.
3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this
misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein al mankind
agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to
that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.
4. "What is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," not universally
assented to. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove
innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to
which al mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those
magnified principles of demonstration, "Whatsoever is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to
be and not to be"; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so
settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any
one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from
having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as
known.
5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, etc. For, first, it is
evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want
of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant
of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on
the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else
but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's
perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds,
with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and
assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For
if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted,
how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to
say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing.
No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet
conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the
mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if
any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable
of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on
the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in
ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if
the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to
know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more,
but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says
nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the
mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge
acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on
the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths
the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious:
in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the
understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the
understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words "to be in the
understanding" have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding,
and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything
is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, "Whatsoever is, is,"
and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot
be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their
understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.
6. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. To avoid this, it is usually
answered, that al men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason; and this is
enough to prove them innate. I answer:
7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who, being
prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For, to apply this
answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things:
either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to
be known and observed by them; or else, that the use and exercise of men's reason, assists them in
the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.
8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. If they mean, that by the use of
reason men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way
of arguing will stand thus, viz., that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us
firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is
made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this,--that by the use of reason we are capable to
come to a certain knowledge of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference
between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be
equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a
rational creature may certainty come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
9. It is false that reason discovers them. But how can these men think the use of reason necessary
to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing
else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already
known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover;
unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate.
We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that
there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is
originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to
make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a
man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impressed truths originally, and before the
use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect
to say, that men know and know them not at the same time.
10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims. It will here perhaps be said
that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon
as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have
occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only,
and that very readily, allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this
different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs, to make them out and to gain our
assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and
assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge,
which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be
confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give
this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for
the same thing to be and not to be," is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that
bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to
depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires
pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was
imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to
discover it?
11. And if there were, this would prove them not innate. Those who will take the pains to reflect with
a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that this ready assent of the mind to
some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the
mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing
to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that "men know and assent to them,
when they come to the use of reason," be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge
of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.
12. The coming to the use of reason not the time we come to know these maxims. If by knowing and
assenting to them "when we come to the use of reason," be meant, that this is the time when they
come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason,
they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false;
because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore
the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many
instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any
knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?" And a great
part of illiterate people and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever
thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these
general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I
add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general
abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are
mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought
into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions,
which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the
sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason
before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men's coming to the use of
reason is the time of their discovery.
13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. In the mean time it is observable,
that this saying, that men know and assent to these maxims "when they come to the use of reason,"
amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,--that they are never known nor taken notice of before
the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man's life; but when is
uncertain. And so may all other knowable truths, as well as these; which therefore have no
advantage nor distinction from others by this note of being known when we come to the use of
reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.
14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery it would not prove them innate.
But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were, when
men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as
frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is
originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be
observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to
exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these
maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the
use of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because
men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate
principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it
comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time
when they are first taken notice of, and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them
innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men "assent to them when they
come to the use of reason," is no more but this,--that the making of general abstract ideas, and the
understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it,
children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having
for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their
ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If
assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I
desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.
15. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. The senses at first let in particular ideas, and
furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are
lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts
them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be
furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And
the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase.
But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow
together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I
confess, is very early in the mind but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will
observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first
which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most
frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and
others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and
perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the
use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call "the use of reason." For a child knows as
certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e., that sweet is
not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not
the same thing.
16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms
mean, and not on their innateness. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he
comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon
explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But
neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting til then
because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in
his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that
proposition upon the same grounds and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a
cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also that he may come to know
afterwards "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," as shall be more fully
shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about
which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them; or
to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent
to those maxims;--whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a
cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he
will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him
put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is
expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen
are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three:
yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the
ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which
are signified by one, two, and three.
17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate. This evasion therefore
of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference
between those suppose innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have
endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally
assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men,
even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they
think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail after they have once understood
the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these
propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the
very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.
18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then "that one and two are equal to three, that sweetness
is not bitterness," and a thousand the like, must be innate. In answer to this, I demand whether
ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain
mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if
it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are
generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with
innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz., of assent at first hearing and understanding the
terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several
propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that two and
two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that everybody
assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate
axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them;
but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet
with assent as soon as they are understood. That "two bodies cannot be in the same place" is a
truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that "it is impossible for the same thing to
be and not to be," that "white is not black," that "a square is not a circle," that "bitterness is not
sweetness." These and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct
ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must
necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and
understanding the terms to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate
propositions as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men can make propositions wherein
different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea is
denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this
general one, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," or that which is the foundation
of it, and is the easier understood of the two, "The same is not different"; by which account they will
have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But, since no
proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to suppose all our
ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, etc., innate, than which there cannot be anything more
opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding
the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate
impressions, but on something else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions
which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.
19. Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims. Nor let it be said, that
those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as that "one
and two are equal to three," that "green is not red," etc., are received as the consequences of those
more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but
take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find that these, and the
like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those who are utterly
ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are
called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.
20. "One and one equal to Two, etc., not general nor useful," answered. If it be said, that these
propositions, viz., "two and two are equal to four," "red is not blue," etc., are not general maxims, nor