Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the case with
benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel
a desire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our
own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and
self-enjoyments? Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be
so eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest,
or safety; and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we
give an enemy; [Footnote: Animasque in vulnere ponunt. VIRG, Dum alteri noceat, sui
negligens says Seneca of Anger. De Ira, I. i.] and what a malignant philosophy must it be,
that will not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges which are undisputably
granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment; such a philosophy is more like a
satyr than a true delineation or description of human nature; and may be a good
foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad one for any serious
argument or reasoning.
